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Background
Patients today have no guarantee of high quality care that is free from risk or harm.
Although most patients receive treatment that improves their health and/or quality of life, an unacceptable number are harmed as a result of their encounter with the health care system (Carthey & Clark, 2009 ). Although it is the responsibility of all who work in healthcare to ensure safe, quality care, nurses are in an extraordinarily influential position to impact the safety and quality of care.
The patient safety movement was highly influenced by the release of the Institute of (Kohn, Corrigan, & Donaldson, 2000) , which called for the health care industry to open its eyes and mouths on the subject of patient error. This report provided staggering figures on the number of deaths due to medical errors annually ( 44 to 98,000) and the associated cost, "estimated between $17 billion and $29 billion, of which health care costs represent over one-half' (p. 1 ). The harm caused to patients results in emotional stress for those who caused it and in a loss of faith in the system by the consumers who depend on it. The report urged the health care profession to build an organizational culture that encourages recognition of and learning from errors. A paradigm shift that challenged the health professions to recognize that human beings make errors and that it is crucial to learn from them and revise our systems to compensate for human limitations was urgently needed.
Medicine (10M) report To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System
Subsequently, many organizations, such as the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), National Quality Forum (NQF), and The Joint Commission (TJC), sharpened their focus on patient safety as a requirement for quality. Many new organizations formed and legislation was passed to help ensure the safety of patients and to promote research to discover and share best practices to prevent error. There has also been a steady growth of research related to errors in health care, which include communication, physical environment, assessment, leadership, and human factors (TJC, 2011) . James Reason (2000) focused on human factors or limitations that make us prone to errors, and proposed that it is rarely one factor that causes a sentinel event. It is usually a series of smaller, minor mistakes, when lined up together that lead to a larger event. A systems approach means recognizing these threats and embedding systems with barriers and defenses that mitigate for inevitable human error (Reason, 2000) . A culture of safety is one in which all members of the healthcare team are aware of and on the lookout for these threats, and also one where best practices are used by all to prevent failures. Adding to the evidence supporting the importance of safety culture, TJC now requires hospital leadership to create and maintain a culture of safety. Leaders are expected to evaluate the safety culture using valid, reliable tools and then implement changes accordingly (TJC Accreditation Manual £-edition, 2010) . Nurses, particularly in advanced practice roles, are uniquely positioned to help build a culture of safety and to incorporate research to promote practice and system changes that compensate for human limitations that lead to error. Safety culture assessment should be used to discover areas of improvement that could lead to fewer adverse events, improved outcomes, and potentially decreased costs.
Definition of the Problem
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At the Miriam Hospital (TMH), a 247 bed community hospital within the Lifespan Network, leadership continuously strives to maintain the safety culture through on-going assessment and planning for improvement. One validated assessment of multiple domains of the safety culture is the Safety Attitude Questionnaire (SAQ) (Sexton et al., 2006) , which has six subscales: teamwork climate; safety climate; job satisfaction; stress recognition; working conditions; perceptions of hospital management; and perceptions of unit management. As part of a state-wide ICU Collaborative, TMH critical care units annually used the SAQ to evaluate the safety culture, and all units made significant improvements (greater than 1 0 percentage points) over the past four years in five of the six domains. In 2010, TMH participants scored among the highest in the state overall in the safety climate and working conditions domains. However, during the same time period, TMH respondents remained among the lowest (below the 'danger zone' of 60%) in the stress recognition subscale. This category measures the acknowledgement of how performance is influenced by stressors, an important skill in order to successfully discuss and learn from errors. In other words, staff respondents did not recognize, and may continually deny, the effect of stress and fatigue on their performance. In a healthy safety culture, recognition of these human limitations reduces the likelihood of error by increasing the use of threat and error management strategies (Sexton, Thomas & Helmreich, 2000) . This author, the critical care educator at TMH, questioned what could be done to improve staffs' awareness of their human limitations, explore strategies that might compensate for these factors, and also make them aware of how not doing so leads to error. A literature review was conducted to identify an evidence based approach that might involve simulation as a strategy. As a result, the author developed a simulation based educational intervention to potentially improve the SAQ scores. The purpose of this study was to evaluate the effect of such an educational experience on the staffs' ability to recognize how stressors affect their performance and lead to error and to learn strategies to counteract this human limitation.
Literature Review
Impact/Etiology of Errors
The staggering fmancial and emotional cost of error was poignantly outlined in the 2001 10M report that estimated that 1.3 million patients are injured each year due to medical error. One major recommendation was that the healthcare system needed to be redesigned in terms of processes and systems to compensate for the limits of human behavior. The patient safety movement began with an attempt to learn from errors by reporting and analyzing them.
Root cause analysis is a structured method for analyzing serious adverse events in order to learn what factors contributed to the event so that they can be eliminated or minimized by system redesign. Since 2004, TJC has kept and reported root cause analysis data, which has demonstrated that human factors are consistently among the leading causes of errors (TJC, 2011) . Many articles cite the seminal works by Rasmussen (1990) and Reason (1990) , who described the performance ofhumans and those factors that impact limitations of human physical and cognitive performance. Human factors include fatigue, multitasking, distraction, illness, stress, workload, lack of knowledge and training, and inadequate communication, which have a negative impact on performance and make error more likely. When combined with "holes" or inconsistencies in systems and processes, these factors make the perfect storm for error. Such factors include the effect of stress and fatigue, both of which impair performance (Sexton, et al., 2000) .
These authors studied teams that worked in safety-critical environments and collected data on attitudes that could be used to design training, including simulation, as a systems approach to improve teamwork as an error prevention strategy. One of the authors, Robert Helmreich, had done extensive work in the aviation field, and found that attitudes toward stress, teamwork, and error are linked to performance and are susceptible to training. In their 2000 study, the authors surveyed 1033 medical personnel from the Intensive care and Operating Room areas as well as 30,000 airline cockpit crew members over three years to compare their attitudes toward error, stress and teamwork. The respondents included cockpit crew members from 40 different airlines in 25 countries over 15 years and medical staff from 12 urban hospitals in several countries. Surveys contained 23 core elements worded specifically for each environment and that measured attitudes toward stress, status hierarchies, leadership, and interpersonal interaction issues.
Sixty to 70% of medical staffbelieved they performed effectively when fatigued or during critical events, as compared to 26% of aviation staff. Seventy percent of medical personnel agreed with statements that denied the effect of stress and fatigue on performance. The authors concluded that this difference may be due to more extensive simulation and teamwork safety training, or crew resource management, in aviation.
In 2005, Rothschild and others conducted a prospective one year observational study to examine the incidence and nature of adverse events and serious errors in the critical care setting. A total of 120 adverse events occurred, of which 54 were preventable. There were also 223 serious errors identified, the most serious occurring during the ordering or execution of treatments. They also noted performance level failures were more often "slips and lapses rather than rule-based or knowledge-based mistakes" (p. 1697).
In a qualitative study, Wetzel et al. (2006) conducted 16 interviews with a purposive sample of London surgeons in order to explore surgical stressors, their impact on performance, and coping strategies used. Semi-structured interviews of individual surgeons were conducted. Findings identified that undue levels of stress impaired judgment, decision-making, and communication. Senior surgeons, in contrast to junior surgerons, were found to have developed strategies for controlling stressful situations, suggesting that such strategies could be learned.
West, Tan, Habermann, Sloan, and Shanafelt (2009) conducted a prospective longitudinal cohort study of 3 80 medical residents to determine the association of fatigue and distress with self-perceived major medical errors. The researchers used electronic surveys that included self-assessment of medical errors, and validated survey tools to measure fatigue, quality of life (QOL ), burnout, and symptoms of depression. Errors were reported by 139 (39%) participants. Reports of error were associated with the Epworth Sleepiness Scale score (p=.002) and fatigue score (p<.001). Subsequent error was also associated with burnout (p<.001) emotional exhaustion (p<.001); lower personal accomplishment (p<.001), a positive depression screen (p<.001), and overall quality of life (QOL) (p<.001). The authors concluded that higher levels of fatigue and distress among medicine residents were independently associated with self-perceived medical errors.
Nurses are not immune from the effects of fatigue. Rogers et al. (2004) conducted a study using logbooks completed by a nation-wide random sample of 393 staff nurses who were also ANA members. The purpose of this study was to determine if an association existed between occurrence of error and hours worked by nurses. Participants recorded information about hours worked and answered questions about errors and near errors they may have made. Nurses who worked more than 12.5 hours were three times more likely to make an error (odds ratio [OR] 3.29; p=.001) and those working more than 40 hours per week significantly increased the risk of making an error (OR 1.96; p <.0001). Scott, Rogers, Hwang and Zhang (201 0) repeated this study with a random sample of 502 American Association of Critical Care Nurses (AACN) members. They also concluded that the risk of error nearly doubled for nurses working more than 12 hours (OR 1.94; p=.03), and noted that these fmdings support the IOM recommendations to minimize the use of 12 hour shifts and to limit shifts to no more than 12 hours.
An experimental within-subjects comparison study evaluated the impact of prolonged continuous wakefulness on resident performance during the management of a simulated patient deterioration (Sharpe et al., 201 0) . Performance was studied during 26 hours of wakefulness at four time points. The frequency of errors was assessed by scorers blinded to the time interval, and overall performance was scored using a rating scale. An increase in the mean number of errors (p=.09) and a decrease in performance (p=.02) as hours of wakefulness increased over time was detected, and the authors concluded that fatigue adversely affected performance and led to errors. Landrigan (2010) noted that Sharpe' s study adds to the "compelling body of evidence" (p.980), including more than 80 relevant studies, that led to the 10M call for the elimination of shifts exceeding 16 hours without sleep. Long shifts, however, continue to remain the norm at many hospitals. This fact, combined with the knowledge that health care workers deny the effects of stress and fatigue on performance, should cause concern amongst nurse leaders. Allowing controllable human factors such as these to be culturally accepted in the nursing profession leaves us vulnerable to error (Denham et al, 2007) .
Safety Culture Interventions
In compliance with TJC recommendations, most hospitals assess safety culture to discover staffs' attitudes that might increase the risk of error, which then provides the opportunity to develop and implement action plans. The Safety Attitude Questionnaire (SAQ) (Sexton et al, 2006) provides specific information about staffs' recognition ofthe relationship between human factors such as stress and fatigue and performance. With information from this measurement tool, safety and quality improvement initiatives can be designed and implemented at the unit level to achieve sustainable results (Hudson, Berenholtz, Thomas, & Sexton, 2009 ). Pronovost et al. (2008) 
Simulation as Safety Culture Intervention
The 10M (2000) and AHRQ (2001) identified simulation as a best practice tool to engage and educate practitioners in health care in order to prevent and mitigate harm.
Other organizations, including the American College of Surgeons, the American Council for Graduate Medical Education and the National League for Nursing and AACN, also support the use of simulation to enhance learning (Cato & Murray, 2010) .
A systematic review conducted by Cant and Cooper (2009) provided an extensive evaluation of the evidence behind simulation as an educational tool in nursing. The review included 12 quantitative studies that compared the effectiveness of medium and high fidelity simulations compared to other methods of education such as lecture, group interaction, case studies, debriefings, or tests. Only one study was a randomized controlled trial; most were pre and post-test quasi-experimental studies with a comparison group. Seven studies included a validated assessment measure. All 12 studies showed statistical improvements in knowledge, skill, critical thinking ability, and/or confidence after simulation education (p. 6), and over half showed simulation to be superior to other methods. What is lacking in the evidence is a standardized tool for measurement of the effect of simulation.
Many studies using simulation and team training were found in the emergency, labor and delivery, and OR arenas. Morey et al. (2002) Participants identified areas where they did not perform well and also participated in problem solving to find ways to improve their performance and identify systems issues that could be improved. The researchers analyzed videotapes, provided findings to unit level leaders, and then developed process improvement initiatives and further team training. The authors compared SAQ scores two months before and six months after the 12 simulation trainings. Although the hospital aggregate data showed no improvement, the perinatal unit had significant improvement in six indices, including improvement at the unit level in teamwork (increased by 5.9%). Follow-up from participants was viewed as crucial because cognitive changes may occur several days after the simulation.
It is clear that safety culture is related to both error and patient outcomes. The safety culture can be measured and is amenable to intervention for improvement. Teamwork and simulation training as a combined intervention were supported as evidence based strategies that can be used to impact ICU staff attitudes, critical to the safety culture.
Theoretical Frameworks
Lazarus' theory of Stress Appraisal and Coping and Kolb's Experiential Learning Theory (1984) were used to guide development ofthe study intervention. Lazarus and Folkman (1984) defmed stress as "a particular relationship between the person and the environment that is appraised by the person as taxing or endangering his or her wellbeing" (p21 ). Humans respond differently to the same stressors and each person evaluates the significance of a situation and reacts accordingly, described as cognitive appraisal. Three types exist: in primary appraisal, a person judges an encounter as irrelevant, benign, or stressful; during secondary appraisal, one considers what can be done; in re-appraisal, the individual changes his/her view of the experience based on new information (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984) . Person factors influence cognitive appraisal, including commitments and beliefs, especially beliefs about personal control. Appraising an outcome as controllable is stress reducing. When commitment is deep, motivation for ameliorative action is increased. Situation factors that influence cognitive appraisal include novelty, predictability, and uncertainty. New and unpredictable situations can cause increased stress; therefore practicing and preparing for events until they are familiar can reduce the stress response (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984) . Providing strategies or resources can influence the secondary appraisal and affect a person's response to stress. Resources include health and energy (including positive beliefs), problem solving skills, social skills, and material resources. There are also constraints that influence a person's coping, including internalized cultural beliefs and values (Lazarus & Folkman) .
An intervention designed to stimulate individuals to appraise situations differently and provide resources to cope effectively may assist in managing stress. Kolb suggested (1984) that learning occurs in a continuous cyclical pattern. Learners interact in a real experience, then reflect on that experience, create meaning, and fit that into existing knowledge. That meaning is then applied to new experiences by thinking and acting differently. Learning is a process where ideas and concepts are formed andreformed through application in experience. This theory can readily be applied to simulation as an educational tool in clinical practice (Billings & Hallstead, 2009 ).
Simulation followed by didactic learning provides for immediate application of learning to a simulated realistic experience, and debriefing allows participants to reflect on their performance to create change for improvement in attitude and behavior. Improvements in performance with use of teamwork skills during patient care events should translate into fewer errors and better patient outcomes.
Methods
Purpose
The purpose of this study was to determine the effect of an eight hour teamwork training with didactic and simulation on critical care staffs' individual and unit level safety culture attitudes.
Design
A before and after quasi-experimental design was used for the study. The independent variable was the simulation intervention; the dependent variables were individual and unit level safety culture attitudes.
Site and Sample
The site was Rhode Island College (RIC) nursing simulation laboratory. The College generously allowed the use of the lab and the simulation faculty contributed their time.
The potential sample consisted of multidisciplinary health professionals, including registered nurses, physicians (attending and fellows), physician assistants, and respiratory therapists employed at TMH. Inclusion criteria included all of these critical care professionals who provided direct patient care; there were no exclusion criteria.
Procedures
The proposal was approved by both the Lifespan and Rhode Island College Institutional Review Boards (IRB). Following IRB approval, participants were recruited from all four critical care units. The researcher posted and emailed an IRB approved flyer (Appendix A) to eligible staff. The project purpose and overview was also announced at staff meetings. It was emphasized that critical care staff who agreed to participate would be required to attend one eight-hour simulation educational training day at the RIC Simulation lab between January and March 2011. Interested participants contacted the researcher directly, at which time an informational letter (Appendix B) was provided and participants identified a date to attend the intervention.
Measurement
Three distinct measurement instruments were used: the Safety Attitude Survey (SAS) Cronbach alphas range from .70 to .83 . The SAQ was developed and refined from the medical translation of a questionnaire used extensively in the aviation industry (Sexton et al. , 2000) . Many organizations use this survey to measure their safety culture and benchmarking data is available (Sexton et al, 2006) . The short form of the University of Texas SAQ was used to measure unit level safety culture attitudes since this is the version used historically at our institution. The authors reported reliability using Raykov' s p coefficient of .90. Four items comprise the stress recognition scale in this version of the tool. The scores in this category were the target of interest for comparison.
Intervention
The intervention included an eight hour educational training incorporating didactics and simulation (Appendix F). On the day oftraining, the informational letter was practices, and change in culture. This interactive session included identifying sources of stress and fatigue, their effects on performance, techniques to mitigate these stressors, and other team based error management strategies. The curriculum used interactive group activities and video clips to illustrate concepts and role play to apply concepts and strategies. After the didactic portion, participants received a brief orientation to the simulation center environment. Next, participants actively participated in a 10-15 minute simulation scenario using high fidelity equipment. The researcher, with the assistance of simulation center personnel, developed the simulation scenarios to replicate patients whose condition deteriorated. A confederate role player intentionally set up a medication error. Participants responded as a team to the situation as they normally would, but were asked to try to implement some of the concepts they learned about during the training. Videotaping was used to guide debriefmg and enhance learning but participants were assured that it was not being used for evaluative purposes and would not be stored but erased immediately after debriefing. During a 20-30 minute debriefmg, the participants were guided to discuss the scenario and whether they were able to implement any of the concepts learned. Any adverse events were discussed and contributing factors explored. Participants had another opportunity to apply concepts to a second simulated experience, and were encouraged to discuss how they could apply teamwork techniques to improve performance in order to prevent errors. In a second debriefing, participants again viewed their performance, discussed how stressors affected their performance, how they used strategies to prevent error, and how these strategies could be applied to future practice. At the conclusion of the program, participants again completed the SAS and the TAQ as well as a course evaluation. Pre and post surveys were linked with a de-identifiable code. A total of six sessions were offered.
All staff on the four critical care units (not just those who attended the training) then received an electronic link via email to complete the SAQ in May, two months after training was completed, with a 50% response rate This optional, confidential, and anonymous survey was administered via survey monkey. SAQ scores completed October 2010 (response rate 75%) as part ofthe statewide ICU collaborative were compared to scores completed post intervention to measure effect of the training on the unit-level safety culture, specifically the stress recognition category.
Data Analysis
Data were analyzed using Sigma Stat. Descriptive statistics were performed on all data.
Results
Twenty seven participants completed both the program and the pre and post surveys, with no missing data. All items on both the T AQ and the SAS showed a difference between pre and post scores that indicated greater agreement with the items. A MannWhitney rank sum test showed that the difference in median values between the pre and post scores were significant for the TAQ (p < .001) and for the SAS (p < .001). Greater difference overall was seen in the SAS before and after scores, those indicating recognition of how stressors impact performance, than the T AQ before and after scores, those indicating agreement with teamwork concepts ( Aggregate SAQ scores from November 2010 (pre-intervention) were compared to aggregrate SAQ scores completed post intervention. For purposes ofthis research, only scores on the stress recognition sub scale, which is comprised of four items, will be reported. Scale scores (mean of all four items in this scale) were calculated for each of the four critical care units and compared to previous scores. A mean scale score for critical care as a whole was also calculated. According to Pascal Metrics Inc., a clinical risk management consulting team that administered the survey for the ICU collaborative, an improvement of 10% or more is considered meaningful and likely to be statistically and practically significant, while smaller differences are more likely due to random variation. Scores are reported as percent positive or the percent of those answering agree or strongly agree with a given item or scale. The goal is to reach 80% positive, indicating that four out of five agree that the climate is good. Scores below 60% ("danger zone") are considered in need of improvement.
As illustrated in Figure 1 , three of the four critical care units improved their stress recognition scale scores by 10% or more (ICU 10%, CVTS 26%, CVTI 11%) while one unit decreased by 1% (CCU). The mean stress recognition scale score for critical care as a whole overall improved significantly from 36 to 47.5%. All scale scores remained under 60%. Three of the four individual items making up the scale showed small improvements (less than 10%). For the item: "Fatigue impairs my performance during emergency situations," the mean scores for critical care showed significant improvement (from 35 to 63%), and three of the four units showed significant improvement (30%, 27%, & 14%) on this item. This one item lifted slightly above the 60% danger zone.
Summary and Conclusions
The inability of interdisciplinary critical care staff to recognize that stress and fatigue alter their performance is a serious risk factor that requires ongoing, intensive intervention. Teamwork training, guided by experiential learning theory, and combined with evidence based strategies and simulation experience contributed to a synergistic learning experience. Participants' evaluations of the program (Appendix G) indicated that all agreed that course objectives were met; participants were satisfied with the training, and most added comments that this training should be mandatory for all employees.
Many commented on how valuable the debriefmg aspect was to apply learning to practice. The significant differences in pre and post survey scores demonstrated that the teamwork training with simulation was effective at impacting individuals' safety culture attitudes. This change in attitude was evident during the video debriefings. Also during the debriefing, the embedded medication error was revealed. Only one group caught the error during simulation. The other groups had to be shown the error they had made and were very surprised. This stimulated much discussion about how strategies could be used to prevent such errors. Other lapses in performance were noted by participants and again generated discussion on how the strategies learned could be used to improve performance. Team strategies were more frequently used in the second scenario following this discussion. Staff acknowledged the important link between communication and error and the negative impact that stressors have on performance that can lead to error. Participants recognized that working and communicating as a team is a strategy that can help to mitigate for this risk and improve patient safety.
At the broader culture level, some significant improvement in scores was seen, possibly indicating that the training did have some impact on safety culture. However, the culture scores as a whole were still below what is desirable and remained in the danger zone, indicating the need for continued and broader intervention.
Limitations included the limited number of participants; since only 20% of critical care professionals participated, short and long term impact on the culture as a whole is expected to be limited. Likewise, the intervention was included in one limited time period; repeating the intervention, and also exploring alternative strategies, including intermittent ' booster' classes, is indicated. It is possible that other ongoing patient safety initiatives such as a communication improvement initiative in the ICU may have had some influence on participants' attitudes. Continued monitoring with the SAQ, administered two months after training, would be beneficial.
Results were shared with the Department ofNursing and hospital leadership, and funding for continued training has been provided. Continued refinement and on-going support of this training will ideally result in practitioners who can recognize and manage the effects of stress and fatigue on performance during clinical events. Improved individual and team performance could logically translate into reduced error, thus potentially creating a safer environment. The institution has endeavored to create a safety culture where risks are reported and error is reduced. When errors do occur as a result of human limitations, there is tremendous ability to learn from those mistakes. This project has certainly contributed to that goal.
Implications for Practice
Consistent with the literature (Cant & Cooper, 2009) , the video debriefing, where participants viewed and analyzed their performance and then discussed how the concepts learned could be implemented in practice, seemed to be the most crucial learning aspect. During debriefing, participants were able to recognize factors that influenced their performance and discuss specific strategies that could be used to compensate for impaired performance. Simulation is a highly effective tool for nurse educators to use to illustrate clinical issues that cannot readily be taught in practice. The cost of simulation and the skill required to develop and fully implement simulation scenarios are potential barriers to simulation intervention and research.
Despite these constraints, simulation provides such a rich, valuable experience that the investment is worthwhile. Hospitals would be wise to invest in simulation equipment and training for educators so that this innovative, evidence-based strategy can be used as an effective means to impact employee' s performance. Improvements in safety culture have been associated with sustained improvements in medication errors, length of stay, nursing turnover rates, and bloodstream infection rates (Hudson et al, 2009 ). Future studies might continue to explore and expand the impact of various types of improvements in safety culture on patient outcomes such as these. A critical question that remains is whether simulation training that results in improvements in safety culture translates to improved and sustained patient outcomes. Participation would Involve attending a one day educational session at Rhode Island College SON simulation lab which is part classroom and part high fidelity simulation. Participation would also involve answering some surveys. Six sessions will be offered. Each session can accommodate 8 participants.
Dates will be posted as soon as sessions are scheduled and will take place in January 2011.
Six Continuing Education Credits will be offered. There is no charge for the educational experience .
Refreshments will also be provided during breaks.
More information will be provided prior to the session so that you may make an informed decision whether or not to participate.
Please contact Heidi Paradis by email hparadis@lifespan.org or by phone at 401-793-3630 if you are interested in participating or for more information . The success of the survey depends on your contribution, so it is important that you answer questions as honestly as you can. There are no right or wrong answers, and often the first answer that comes to mind is best. All data are strictly confidential. No individual feedback will be given to your supervisors or colleagues, so feel free to express your opinion. Your participation in the study is valued and appreciated. Please place a checkmark in the box that matches your level of agreement with the statement. 
Appendix B Informational Letter for Simulation Educational Session
3.
This facility's administration influences the success of direct care teams.
4.
A team's mission is of greater value than the goals of individual team members.
5.
Effective team members can anticipate the needs of other team members. High-petforming teams in health care share common 6. chara ctet~tic s ''•ith high-perfomling teams in other industries.
Lndenldp
7.
It is impmtant for leaders to share inf01mation with team members.
8.
Leaders should create informal oppmn111ities for team members to share information.
9.
Effective leaders view honest nlistakes as meaningful leamine: opp011llllities.
10.
It is a leader's responsibility to model appropriate team behavior.
11.
It is important for leaders to take time to discuss with their team members plans for each patient. 
Sinaatioa Mollitorlaa
13.
Individuals can be taught hm.,-to scan the etwironment for ll.npottant situational cu es.
14.
Yiouitoring patients provides an impmt ant contribution to effective team performance.
Even individuals who are not part of the direct care team 15. should be encouraged to scan for and repott changes in patient status.
16.
It is impon ant to monitor the emotional and physical status of other team members.
17.
It is appropriate for one team member to offer assistance to anod1er \Vho may be too tired or sn·essed to pexfmm a task.
18.
Team members who monitor their em otional and physical status on the job are more effective.
Mataal SuPPOrt
19.
To be effective. team members should understand the w ork of their fellow team members.
20.
Asking for assistance from a team member is a sign that an individual does not knmv how to do his/her j ob effectiYely.
21.
Providing assistance to team mem bers is a sign iliat an individual does not have enoue:h work to do. Offering to help a fellow team member wim his/her 22. individual work tasks is an . effec tive tool for ll.nproving team perfonnance.
23.
It is appropriate to continue to assett a patient safety concem until you are ce1tain iliat it has been heard.
24.
Personal conflicts benveen team memb ers do not affect patient safety. 
